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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) provides us a powerful
approach to resist all attacks at detection side. Besides the unconditional security, people also seek
for high key generation rate, but MDI-QKD has relatively low key generation rate. In this paper,
we provide an efficient approach to increase the key generation rate of MDI-QKD by adopting
multiple degrees of freedom (DOFs) of single photons to generate keys. Compared with other high-
dimension MDI-QKD protocols encoding in one DOF, our protocol is more flexible, for our protocol
generating keys in independent subsystems and the detection failure or error in a DOF not affecting
the information encoding in other DOFs. Based on above features, our MDI-QKD protocol may
have potential application in future quantum communication field.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Pp, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Bennett-Brassard-1984 (BB84) quantum key
distribution (QKD) protocol [1] was proposed, quantum
secure communication based on QKD has experienced
a long-term development, which has become an inter-
esting research area in both theory and experiment [2–
16]. Throughout the whole development process of QKD,
there are always struggle between attack and anti-attack
strategies, which focus on the discrepancy between per-
fect theory and practice [17]. Although QKD is abso-
lutely secure in theory, in reality, due to the imperfect
measurement devices and quantum signal source, QKD
system cannot guarantee the unconditional security of
keys in practical condition. For example, practical pho-
ton detectors are vulnerable to various types of attacks
such as the time-shift attacks [18–20], detection blinding
attacks [21], beam-splitter attack [22, 23] and fate-stack
attacks [24, 25]. In addition, eavesdroppers can also take
use of imperfect quantum signal sources to perform at-
tack [26, 27], such as the photon-number-splitting (PNS)
attack [28]. The problem from PNS attack can be solved
by the decoy state method [29–32].
In 2007, Ac´ın group first put forward the device-
independent QKD (DI-QKD) protocols [33]. DI-QKD
does not require detailed knowledge of how devices
work and ensures the security based on the violation
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of Bell inequality. DI-QKD can defend all possible at-
tacks from imperfect experimental devices. However,
DI-QKD requires quite high detection efficiency, which
limits its secure communication distance to be less than
5 km [34–36]. In 2012, the group of Lo proposed the
concept measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-
QKD), which is immune to all possible attacks from mea-
surement devices [37]. In MDI-QKD, Alice and Bob pre-
pare single photons randomly in one of two bases and
send the encoding photons to a third party (Charlie).
Charlie performs a Bell-state analysis (BSA) on them
and publish his result. Here, Charlie needs not to be
trusted and can even be completely controlled by the
eavesdropper. Combined with the decoy state method,
the MDI-QKD can resist all the possible attacks from im-
perfect photon source and measurement devices. During
the past few years, MDI-QKD has well developed [38–
46]. For example, in 2016, Yin et al. reported results for
MDI-QKD over 404 km of ultralow-loss optical fiber and
311 km of standard optical fiber [44]. Besides security,
practical application requires high key generation rate.
However, comparing with other QKD forms, MDI-QKD
has relatively low key generation rate. Increasing sin-
gle photon’s capacity is important for increasing MDI-
QKD’s key generation rate. In general, there are two
methods to increase single photon’s capacity. The first
one is the high-dimension (HD) encoding in one degree of
freedom (DOF) [47–59]. In 2016, the group of Chau pro-
posed the first qudit-based MDI-QKD protocol using lin-
ear optics [53]. In 2018, Dellantonio et al. designed two
HD MDI-QKD protocols based on spatial-encoding and
2temporal-encoding multi-mode qudits, respectively [56].
The other one is the hyper-encoding in multiple DOFs
[60–62]. For hyper-encoding, information is simultane-
ously encoded in multiple DOFs of a quantum system.
The information encoding in different DOFs are inde-
pendent with each other. The single photons encoded
in multiple DOFs have also been used to realize high-
capacity quantum communication, such as high-capacity
quantum teleportation [63], high-capacity dense coding
[64], and high-capacity quantum secure direct communi-
cation [65–67].
In this protocol, we propose a general method to in-
crease MDI-QKD’s key generation rate by adopting the
qudits encoding in multiple DOFs to generate keys. We
take the qudits encoding in polarization and two longi-
tudinal momentum DOFs for example, which have been
experimentally generated [68]. In this protocol, both Al-
ice and Bob encode their photons in three DOFs inde-
pendently and send the encoded photons to Charlie for
the hyperentanglement Bell state analysis (HBSA). In
our MDI-QKD protocol, the encoding information in all
DOFs can be used to generate the secure key, so that it
can effectively increase MDI-QKD’s key generation rate.
Each DOF can be manipulated independently and they
do not influence each other. We will prove that our MDI-
QKD protocol is unconditionally secure and calculate its
key generation rate. Our MDI-QKD protocol has big
application potential in future quantum secure commu-
nication field.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. In
section II, we explain MDI-QKD protocol based on the
qudits encoding in polarization and two longitudinal mo-
mentum DOFs. In section III, we make the security anal-
ysis of our MDI-QKD protocol and evaluate its key gener-
ation rate. In section IV, we give a discussion. In Section
V, we make a conclusion.
II. THE MDI-QKD PROTOCOL ADOPTING
THREE DOFS OF SINGLE PHOTONS
Before we begin our protocol, we first introduce our
encoding rules in three DOFs. In each DOF, Alice and
Bob use two sets of bases, say, rectilinear base and di-
agonal base. In the polarization DOF, the rectilinear
base is {|H〉, |V 〉}, where |H〉 and |V 〉 denote horizon-
tal and vertical polarizations, respectively. The diagonal
base is {|+〉p = 1√2 (|H〉 + |V 〉), |−〉p =
1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉)}.
In the first longitudinal-momentum DOF, the rectilin-
ear base is {|L〉,|R〉}, where |L〉 and |R〉 represent the
left and right spatial modes. The diagonal base includes
{|+〉f = 1√2 (|L〉+|R〉), |−〉f =
1√
2
(|L〉−|R〉)}. In the sec-
ond longitudinal-momentum DOF, the rectilinear base is
{|I〉,|E〉} and the diagonal base is {|+〉s = 1√2 (|I〉+ |E〉),
|−〉s = 1√2 (|I〉 − |E〉)}, where |I〉 and |E〉 represent the
internal and external spatial modes, respectively. In po-
larization DOF, |H〉 and |+〉p represent the binary value
0 while |V 〉 and |−〉p represent the binary value 1. In the
first (second) longitudinal-momentum DOF, |L(I)〉 and
|+〉f(s) represent 0 while |R(E)〉 and |−〉f(s) represent 1.
The basic principle of our MDI-QKD protocol is shown
in Fig. 1, whose procedure can be described as follows.
Step1: Alice and Bob separately prepare single pho-
tons from single photon sources (SPSs). First, they make
the single photons pass through polarization modulators
(Pol-Ms) to realize the encoding in polarization DOF.
In Fig. 1(a) and (b), we show the generation princi-
ple of qudits in rectilinear and diagonal bases in both
longitudinal momentum DOFs, respectively. BS means
the 50:50 beam splitter and acts as the Hadamard gate
in two longitudinal-momentum DOFs. It can convert
|L〉 into |+〉f , |R〉 into |−〉f , |I〉 into |+〉s, and |E〉 into
|−〉s. Here, we give a simple example for the generation
of qudits in the diagonal base of both two longitudinal-
momentum DOFs. As shown in Fig. 1(b), if Alice (Bob)
wants to generate |+〉f ⊗ |+〉s, she (he) first prepares a
single photon in the spatial momentum |L〉|E〉. Then,
after passing the photon successively through BS2A(B),
BS3A(B), and BS4A(B), the photon state |L〉|E〉 will fi-
nally evolve to |+〉f ⊗ |+〉s. In this way, Alice and
Bob can prepare single-photon qudits encoding in three
DOFs. For instance, if Alice’s encoding key is 000, there
are totally eight possible states that Alice can prepare,
say, |H〉 ⊗ |L〉 ⊗ |I〉, |H〉 ⊗ |L〉 ⊗ |+〉s, |H〉 ⊗ |+〉f ⊗ |I〉,
|H〉 ⊗ |+〉f ⊗ |+〉s, |+〉p ⊗ |L〉 ⊗ |I〉, |+〉p ⊗ |L〉 ⊗ |+〉s,
|+〉p⊗|+〉f⊗|I〉, and |+〉p⊗|+〉f⊗|+〉s. After encoding,
Alice and Bob send their qudits to a third party Charlie
through quantum channels, respectively.
Step2: After Charlie receiving the photon qudits sent
by Alice and Bob, he performs a hyperentangled-Bell-
state analysis (HBSA) [69] on the photon pairs, which
can completely distinguish the four Bell states in each
DOF. The Bell states in three DOFs can be written as
|Φ±〉p = 1√
2
(|H〉a|H〉b ± |V 〉a|V 〉b),
|Ψ±〉p = 1√
2
(|H〉a|V 〉b ± |V 〉a|H〉b).
|Φ±〉f = 1√
2
(|L〉a|L〉b ± |R〉a|R〉b),
|Ψ±〉f = 1√
2
(|L〉a|R〉b ± |R〉a|L〉b),
|Φ±〉s = 1√
2
(|I〉a|I〉b ± |E〉a|E〉b),
|Ψ±〉s = 1√
2
(|I〉a|E〉b ± |E〉a|I〉b), (1)
where the subscript a (b) represents Alice’s (Bob’s) lo-
cation. After the measurements, Charlie announces his
measurement results in a public channel.
Step3: Alice and Bob announce the generation bases
of all their qudits in all DOFs through public channels.
If they select different bases in a DOF, they have to dis-
card the information encoding in this DOF. On the other
hand, if they select the same base in a DOF, they can
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FIG. 1: Schematic diagram of the MDI-QKD protocol adopting three DOFs of single photons. Alice and Bob separately prepare
single photons from single photon sources (SPSs). Pol-M is a polarization modulator which is used to implement encoding in
polarization DOF. (a) and (b) represent the encoding in rectilinear and diagonal bases in two longitudinal momentum DOFs,
respectively. The BSs are used to perform a Hadamard operation in two longitudinal-momentum DOFs. Here, |L〉 (|R〉) and
|I〉 (|E〉) represent the left (right) and internal (external) momentums. After the qudits generation, the qudits from Alice and
Bob are sent to Charlie to make the complete hyperentangled-Bell-state analysis (HBSA), which can completely distinguish
the four Bell states in each DOF.
obtain the encoding information for each other in this
DOF. Here, we suppose that the key is transmitted from
Alice to Bob. To guarantee that their photon strings are
correctly correlated, Bob needs to make a post-selection.
The post-selection principles in three DOFs are totally
the same, which are shown in Tab. 1. If both they use
the rectilinear base in a DOF, Bob has to apply a bit-flip
operation to his data corresponding to the measurement
result of |ψ±〉, and he keeps his original data correspond-
ing to the measurement result of |φ±〉. On the other
hand, if both they use the diagonal base in a DOF, Bob
applies a bit-flip operation to his data corresponding to
the measurement result of |φ−〉 or |ψ−〉, and he keeps his
original data corresponding to the measurement result of
|φ+〉 or |ψ+〉.
Step4: Alice and Bob repeat steps (1) to (3) until they
get enough amount of keys.
Step5: To ensure the security of the key transmis-
sion, Alice and Bob choose the qudits encoding in di-
agonal bases {|+〉p, |−〉p}, {|+〉f , |−〉f}, and {|+〉s, |−〉s}
to evaluate the quantum bit error rates (QBERs) in three
DOFs. In detail, they announce the encoding informa-
tion in a DOF over a public channel. This enables them
to check Charlie’s measurement results by calculating the
QBER in this DOF. If the QBERs in all DOFs are smaller
than the threshold, the key transmission process can be
trusted. Otherwise, if the QBER in any DOF is higher
than the threshold, the key transmission process has to
be abandoned.
Step6: Alice and Bob perform the error correction and
private amplification to complete the generation of final
secure keys.
To facilitate understanding, we discuss our protocol in
a specific example, where Alice’s encoding information
is 000 and Bob’s encoding information is 101. Here, we
neglect the security checking for simplicity. According to
TABLE I: The post-selection principle of Bob in all DOFs
based on the Bell-state measurement (BSM) result and the
basis selection
BSM result |Φ+〉 |Φ−〉 |Ψ+〉 |Ψ−〉
Rectilinear basis - - bit flip bit flip
Diagonal basis - bit flip - bit flip
the base choice, there are four different cases. In each
case, we give an example to illustrate the protocol.
In the first case, the bases in all DOFs of the photons
sent by Alice and Bob are the same. We assume that Al-
ice prepares |H〉a|L〉a|I〉a and Bob prepares |V 〉b|L〉b|E〉b.
Under this case, the whole photon state in Charlie’s lo-
cation can be written as
|H〉a|L〉a|I〉a ⊗ |V 〉b|L〉b|E〉b
= |H〉a|V 〉b ⊗ |La〉|L〉b ⊗ |I〉a|E〉b
=
1√
2
(|Ψ+〉p + |Ψ−〉p)⊗ 1√
2
(|Φ+〉f + |Φ−〉f )
⊗ 1√
2
(|Ψ+〉s + |Ψ−〉s)
=
1
2
√
2
(|Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s + |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s + |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s + |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s + |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s). (2)
According to the measurement results and their base
selection, Alice and Bob can know that their en-
coding in the polarization and second longitudinal-
momentum DOFs are opposite and the encoding in the
first longitudinal-momentum DOF is same. In this way,
Bob only needs to make bit-flip operations in polarization
4and second longitudinal-momentum DOFs and keeps his
original data in the first longitudinal-momentum DOF.
Then, he can obtain the encoding keys from Alice.
In the second case, Alice and Bob choose same basis
in two DOFs. For example, Alice prepares |H〉a|L〉a|I〉a
for 000 and Bob prepares |V 〉b|+〉fb|E〉b for 101. In this
case, the whole photon state at Charlie’s side is
|H〉a|L〉a|I〉a ⊗ |V 〉b|+〉fb|E〉b
= |H〉a|V 〉b ⊗ |L〉a|+〉fb ⊗ |I〉a|E〉b
=
1√
2
(|Ψ+〉p + |Ψ−〉p)⊗ 1
2
(|Φ+〉f + |Φ−〉f + |Ψ+〉f
+ |Ψ−〉f )⊗ 1√
2
(|Ψ+〉s + |Ψ−〉s)
=
1
4
(|Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s + |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s + |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Ψ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s + |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Ψ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Ψ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s + |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Ψ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s + |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s + |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Ψ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s + |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Ψ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Ψ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s + |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Ψ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s).
(3)
In this situation, after the HBSA, Bob can obtain
that Alice’s encoding in the polarization and second
longitudinal-momentum DOFs are opposite with his en-
coding. However, Bob needs to abandon the information
in the first longitudinal momentum DOF. The reason is
that the BSA in the first longitudinal-momentum DOF
may obtain all the four results with the same probabil-
ity and Bob may obtain wrong result of Alice’s encoding
with the probability of 50%.
In the third case, Alice and Bob choose the same
base in only one DOF. Assuming that Alice pre-
pares |H〉a|L〉a|I〉a representing 000 and Bob prepares
|V 〉b|+〉fb|−〉sb for 101. The HBSA process of the whole
photon state can be written as
M = |H〉a|L〉a|I〉a ⊗ |V 〉b|+〉fb|−〉sb
= |H〉a|V 〉b ⊗ |L〉a|+〉fb ⊗ |I〉a|−〉sb
=
1√
2
(|Ψ+〉p + |Ψ−〉p)⊗ 1
2
(|Φ+〉f + |Φ−〉f + |Ψ+〉f
+ |Ψ−〉f )⊗ 1
2
(|Φ+〉s + |Φ−〉s − |Ψ+〉s − |Ψ−〉s)
=
1
4
√
2
(|Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Φ+〉s + |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Φ−〉s
− |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s − |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Φ+〉s + |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Φ−〉s
− |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s − |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Ψ+〉f ⊗ |Φ+〉s + |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Ψ+〉f ⊗ |Φ−〉s
− |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Ψ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s − |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Ψ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Ψ−〉f ⊗ |Φ+〉s + |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Ψ−〉f ⊗ |Φ−〉s
− |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Ψ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s − |Ψ+〉p ⊗ |Ψ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Φ+〉s + |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Φ−〉s
− |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s − |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Φ+〉s + |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Φ−〉s
− |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s − |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Φ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Ψ+〉f ⊗ |Φ+〉s + |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Ψ+〉f ⊗ |Φ−〉s
− |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Ψ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s − |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Ψ+〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s
+ |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Ψ−〉f ⊗ |Φ+〉s + |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Ψ−〉f ⊗ |Φ−〉s
− |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Ψ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ+〉s − |Ψ−〉p ⊗ |Ψ−〉f ⊗ |Ψ−〉s.).(4)
It is obvious that Bob can only obtain Alice’s encoding
in the polarization DOF after the bit-flip operation.
In the last case, Alice and Bob choose different bases
in all DOFs. For example, Alice prepares |H〉a|L〉a|I〉a
state and Bob prepares |−〉pb|+〉fb|−〉sb. In this case,
they have to abandon the two photons.
The possible BSA results and Bob’s post-selection op-
erations in three DOFs are described in Tab. II, Tab.
III, and Tab. IV, respectively.
III. THE KEY GENERATION RATE OF THE
MDI-QKD IN 3DOFS
In this section, we discuss the security and key gen-
eration rate of our MDI-QKD protocol adopting three
DOFs of single qudits. Our MDI-QKD protocol is based
on the original MDI-QKD protocol from Lo et al. [37].
In our MDI-QKD protocol, Alice and Bob use the single
photons combined with Pol-Ms and BSs to prepare the
signal photon qudits and send them to Charlie to make
the HBSA. According to the security proof of the original
MDI-QKD protocol, the security proof of our protocol is
also based on that of the time-reversed EPR-based QKD
protocol [70].
In theory, the encoding space of our MDI-QKD proto-
col includes three essentially independent subspaces. In
ideal scenario, say, ideal single photon sources and quan-
tum channels, one single photon can generate three bits
of secure keys. As a result, the key generation rate of
our MDI-QKD protocol is R = 3. On the other hand,
if we take imperfections such as imperfect single photon
sources and noisy quantum channels, the key generation
rate will be reduced. Here, we investigate the influence
from the misalignment in imperfect single photon sources
and channels to the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and
the key generation rate of our MDI-QKD protocol. In
each DOF, we use the encoding in rectilinear base for key
generation and the encoding in diagonal basis to evaluate
the QBER. According to the original MDI-QKD proto-
col [3, 7, 9, 37], the secure key generation rate in the ith
DOF can be written as
Ri = R0(1 −H(exi)− f(ezi)H(ezi)), (5)
where i = p, f, s, and f(ezi) is an inefficiency function
for the error correction in the ith DOF. We suppose
5TABLE II: Possible BSA results and Bob’s post-selection operation in polarization DOF.
Bit data BSA results and probabilities Whether or not to bit-flip
Alice Bob |φ+〉p |φ
−〉p |ψ
+〉p |ψ
−〉p
|H〉 |H〉 1
2
1
2
0 0 −
|H〉 |V 〉 0 0 1
2
1
2
bit-flip
|V 〉 |H〉 0 0 1
2
1
2
bit-flip
|V 〉 |V 〉 1
2
1
2
0 0 −
1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉) 1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉) 1
2
0 1
2
0 −
1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉) 1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉) 0 1
2
0 1
2
bit flip
1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉) 1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉) 0 1
2
0 1
2
bit flip
1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉) 1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉) 1
2
0 1
2
0 −
TABLE III: Possible BSA results and Bob’s post-selection operation in the first longitudinal-momentum DOF.
Bit data BSA results and probabilities Whether or not to bit-flip
Alice Bob |φ+〉f |φ
−〉f |ψ
+〉f |ψ
−〉f
|L〉 |L〉 1
2
1
2
0 0 −
|L〉 |R〉 0 0 1
2
1
2
bit-flip
|R〉 |L〉 0 0 1
2
1
2
bit-flip
|R〉 |R〉 1
2
1
2
0 0 −
1√
2
(|L〉+ |R〉) 1√
2
(|L〉 + |R〉) 1
2
0 1
2
0 −
1√
2
(|L〉+ |R〉) 1√
2
(|L〉 − |R〉) 0 1
2
0 1
2
bit flip
1√
2
(|L〉 − |R〉) 1√
2
(|L〉 + |R〉) 0 1
2
0 1
2
bit flip
1√
2
(|L〉 − |R〉) 1√
2
(|L〉 − |R〉) 1
2
0 1
2
0 −
TABLE IV: Possible BSA results and Bob’s post-selection operation in the second longitudinal-momentum DOF.
Bit data BSA results and probabilities Whether or not to bit-flip
Alice Bob |φ+〉s |φ
−〉s |ψ
+〉s |ψ
−〉s
|I〉 |I〉 1
2
1
2
0 0 −
|I〉 |E〉 0 0 1
2
1
2
bit-flip
|E〉 |I〉 0 0 1
2
1
2
bit-flip
|E〉 |E〉 1
2
1
2
0 0 −
1√
2
(|I〉+ |E〉) 1√
2
(|I〉+ |E〉) 1
2
0 1
2
0 −
1√
2
(|I〉+ |E〉) 1√
2
(|I〉 − |E〉) 0 1
2
0 1
2
bit flip
1√
2
(|I〉 − |E〉) 1√
2
(|I〉+ |E〉) 0 1
2
0 1
2
bit flip
1√
2
(|I〉 − |E〉) 1√
2
(|I〉 − |E〉) 1
2
0 1
2
0 −
that Charlie locates in the middle of Alice and Bob, so
that the distance (dAC) from Alice to Charlie is half
of the distance from Alice to Bob (d). In this way,
R0 = 10
−a0d/20 · 10−a0d/20 = 10−a0d/10 (a = 0.2dB/km).
H(x) is the binary entropy with the form of
H(x) = −xlog2x− (1− x)log2(1− x). (6)
As the encoding in three DOFs are independent, the total
secure key generation rate can be calculated as
R = R0[(1−H(exp)− f(ezp)H(ezp))
+ (1 −H(exf )− f(ezf )H(ezf ))
+ (1 −H(exs)− f(ezs)H(ezs))]. (7)
If we suppose the QBERs in three DOFs are the same,
R is three times of Ri.
6We first consider the misalignment influence from the
imperfect single photon sources. We take the source mis-
alignment in polarization DOF as an example. When
Alice (Bob) aims to prepare a photon in |H〉 or |V 〉, the
practical photon state expands to βp|H〉+
√
1− β2p |V 〉 or
βp|V 〉 +
√
1− β2p|H〉, respectively, while when they aim
to prepare a photon in |±p〉, the practical photon state
expands to βp|+p〉+
√
1− β2p|−p〉 or βp|−〉+
√
1− β2p|+〉,
respectively [56].
Next, we analyze the most general errors affecting qu-
dits in transmission channels, say, the polarization and
spatial-mode misalignments caused by the channel noise.
We define that the operator UAp(f,s) and UBp(f,s) repre-
sent the misalignment in the polarization (first and sec-
ond longitudinal momentum) DOF of Alice’s and Bob’s
channel transmission. Here, we consider a simplified
model with a two-dimensional unitary matrix as [71]
Ui =
(
cosθi −sinθi
sinθi cosθi
)
, (8)
where i = p, f, s, and θi is in the scale of [−pi, pi]. We
also take the polarization DOF as an example. Due to
the misalignment in channel transmission, we can obtain
|H〉 → cosθp|H〉− sinθp|V 〉, |V 〉 → cosθp|V 〉+ sinθp|H〉,
|+p〉 → cosθp|+p〉 + sinθp|−p〉, |−p〉 → cosθp|−p〉 −
sinθp|+p〉. As a result, the misalignment error rate is
defined as sin2θp. In the other two DOFs, we can obtain
similar misalignment error rates as sin2θf and sin
2θs,
respectively.
In this way, we combine the misalignment from source
and channel transmission. If Alice and Bob aim to send
|H〉|H〉 to Charlie, the practical photon states Charlie
receiving will evolve to
|HH〉 → β2p |HH〉+ (1− β2p)|V V 〉
+ βp
√
1− β2p(|HV 〉+ |V H〉)
→ A0p|HH〉+A1p|V V 〉
+ A2p(|HV 〉+ |V H〉)
=
A0p +A1p√
2
|φ+〉+ A0p −A1p√
2
|φ−〉
+
√
2A2p|ψ+〉, (9)
where
A0p = β
2
pcos
2θp + (1 − β2p)sin2θp
+ 2βp
√
1− β2pcosθpsinθp,
A1p = β
2
psin
2θp + (1− β2p)cos2θp
− 2βp
√
1− β2pcosθpsinθp,
A2p = −β2pcosθpsinθp + (1 − β2p)cosθpsinθp
+ βp
√
1− β2p(cos2θp − sin2θp). (10)
In this way, there is a probability of 2A22p that Char-
lie obtains wrong BSA result |ψ+〉, thus increasing the
QBER ezp = 2A
2
2p. If Alice and Bob both select the
diagonal basis, i.e., |+〉p|+〉p, they will also obtain er-
ror rate exp = ezp. Similarly, we can also calculate the
QBER in other two DOFs as ezf = exf = 2A
2
2f and
ezs = exs = 2A
2
2s, respectively.
Taking the value of QBER in each DOF into Eq. (5),
we can calculate the key generation rate (Rp(f,s)) in each
DOF and the total key generation rate (R). Here, we
control |βp(f,s)|2 = 0.85 and sin2θp(f,s) = 1.5%. The
inefficiency function for the error correction process is
set to fezp(f,s) = 1. In Fig. 2(a), we show the values of
R and Rp as a function of the communication distance
(d) between Alice and Bob in the scale of 0 ≤ d ≤ 50km.
Actually, Rp equals to the key generation rate of the
original MDI-QKD using only one DOF of single photons.
It can be found that by encoding in three DOFs of single
photons, we can efficiently increase the key generation
rate of MDI-QKD. In Fig. 2(b), we show the value of
LgR as a function d in the scale of 0 ≤ d ≤ 300 km.
Here, we control sin2θp(f,s) = 1.5% and |βp(f,s)|2 = 0.85
and 0.9. It is obvious that with the growth of QBERs,
the total key generation rate obviously reduces.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In the paper, we propose a high-capacity MDI-QKD
protocol, which adopts the photon qudits encoding in
three DOFs to generate keys. In our protocol, both Alice
and Bob generate single photons encoding in polarization
and two longitudinal-momentum DOFs and send them to
Charlie for HBSA. Here, we adopt the HBSA protocol in
Ref. [69] to completely distinguish the 64 hyperentangled
Bell states with the help of the QND gates constructed by
cross-Kerr nonlinearity. As the encoding information in
each DOF can be used to generate secure key, encoding in
multiple DOFs of single photons can efficiently increase
the key generation rate of MDI-QKD. Actually, our MDI-
QKD protocol can be extended to use generalN DOFs of
single photons (N ≥ 2). In this general case, both Alice
and Bob generate single photons encoding inN DOFs. In
each DOF, they randomly choose rectilinear or diagonal
base to encode the photon. The four Bell states in each
DOF can be written as
|Φ±〉k = 1√
2
(|0〉a|0〉b ± |1〉a|1〉b),
|Ψ±〉k = 1√
2
(|0〉a|1〉b ± |1〉a|0〉b). (11)
where |0〉 and |1〉 represent two orthogonal states in
rectilinear or diagonal base in the kth DOF (k =
1, 2, 3, · · ·N). In the HBSA process, Charlie requires to
construct the QND gates, which make he can completely
distinguish all the four Bell states in each DOF, that is,
4N hyperentangled Bell states in total. As long as the
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FIG. 2: (a) The key generation rate (Rp) in polarization DOF and total secure key generation rates (R) of our MDI-QKD
protocol as a function of the communication distance between Alice and Bob. We control |βp(f,s)|
2 = 0.85 and sin2θp(f,s) = 1.5%.
The inefficiency function for the error correction process is set as fezp(f,s) = 1 [56]. (b) The value of LgR as a function d in the
scale of 0 ≤ d ≤ 300km, with sin2θp(f,s) = 1.5% and |βp(f,s)|
2 = 0.85 and 0.9.
QND in each DOF is available, we can calculate the key
generation rate in each DOF according to Eq. (5). There-
fore, the total key generation rate of our MDI-QKD pro-
tocol using N DOFs of single photons can be expressed
as
R = NRp. (12)
Here, we compare our protocol with the N -dimensional
MDI-QKD protocol put forward by Dellantonio et al.
[56]. In Ref. [56], the MDI-QKD protocol uses the
HD qudits encoding in different spatial paths or time
slots, which could also increase MDI-QKD’s key genera-
tion rate. Our protocol has an attractive advantage over
theirs, that is, our protocol is more flexible. In detail,
for the protocol in Ref. [56], if a detection failure or
an error occurs in a qudit, this qudit cannot be used to
generate the key. For our MDI-QKD protocol, the HD
system includes N essentially independent subsystems.
The N subsystems can be manipulated and measured
independently. As a result, if a detection failure or an
error occurs in one DOF, the encoding information in
this DOF has to be discarded. However, the encoding
information in other DOFs can also be used to gener-
ate the key. We have to abandon a single photon qudit
only when the error or detection efficiency happens in
all DOFs. In this way, the more DOFs of single pho-
tons the MDI-QKD protocol uses, the MDI-QKD proto-
col shows the stronger resistance to errors and detection
inefficiency. On the other hand, our MDI-QKD protocol
requires single-photon sources. In practical experiments,
the phase-randomized coherent state source is often used
instead of the traditional single-photon source. However,
the secret key rate will decrease significantly due to the
vacuum state with large probability. For increasing the
secret key rate, we may also adopt the coherent-state su-
perpositions source, which can avoid the disadvantage of
the phase-randomized coherent state source and has been
used in MDI-QKD field [42].
The key step of our multiple-DOF MDI-QKD protocol
is the HBSA. Such HBSA protocol was also used in real-
izing the high-capacity quantum secure direct communi-
cation [72] and constructing the two-photon three DOFs
hyper-parallel controlled phase-flip gate [73]. However,
the complete HBSA protocol adopted in our MDI-QKD
protocol requires the cross-Kerr nonlinearity technique,
which is still a challenge under current experimental con-
dition. The main reason is that the natural cross-Kerr
nonlinearity is quite weak, so that it is difficult to use
homodyne detection to discriminate two overlapping co-
herent states [71]. However, some great progresses on the
cross-Kerr nonlinearity have been made in recent years
[74–78]. For example, in 2016, Du¨rr et al. reported that
they realized a strong interaction in Rydberg electromag-
netically induced transparency (EIT) experiments to cre-
ate a large controlled phase shift of 3.3±0.2 rad, with the
incoming control pulses containing an average of 0.6 pho-
tons [77]. In 2019, the group of Sinclair observed the non-
linear phases of 8 mrad/nW of signal power, correspond-
ing to a χ3 of 10−8 m2/V 2 [78]. In addition, several at-
tractive HBSA protocols based on other nonlinear optical
elements have also been proposed, such as quantum-dot
spins in optical microcavities [79–81], nitrogen-vacancy
centers in resonators [82], and a three-level Λ-type sys-
tem [83]. Recently, based on probabilistic HBSA, the first
quantum teleportation of a single photon encoded in both
spin and orbital angular momentum DOFs has also been
achieved by the group of Pan [63]. Therefore, based on
these works, we believe that the N -DOF complete HBSA
may be experimentally realized in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, we propose a high-capacity MDI-QKD
protocol, which adopts single photons encoding in mul-
tiple DOFs to generate secure keys. We take the qudits
encoding in polarization and two longitudinal momen-
tum DOFs as an example. Alice and Bob randomly pre-
8pare the qudits encoding in above three DOFs and send
them to a third party Charlie through quantum channels.
Then, Charlie makes the complete HBSA on the photon
pairs and publishes his results. According to Charlie’s
HBSA results and the bases of photon qudits in three
DOFs announced by both sides, Bob can obtain Alice’s
secure key when they choose same base. Our MDI-QKD
protocol is unconditionally secure. By adopting the qu-
dits encoding in multiple DOFs, our protocol can ob-
viously increase the information capacity of single pho-
ton, and thus increase MDI-QKD’s key generation rate.
Moreover, comparing with previous HD MDI-QKD pro-
tocol in one DOF, our protocol still has some advantages.
The HD system in our protocol includes some essentially
independent subsystems, which can be manipulated and
measured independently. As a result, a detection failure
or an error in one DOF does not affect the encoding infor-
mation in other DOFs, which can also be used to generate
the key. In this way, our MDI-QKD protocol is more flex-
ible. The more DOFs we adopt, our MDI-QKD protocol
has the stronger resistance to errors or detection ineffi-
ciency. Based on above features, our MDI-QKD protocol
may have application potential in the near future.
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